Towards the European Union’s foreign policy 2025 : taking stock of the Dahrendorf foresight project by SUS, Monika
Towards the European Union’s Foreign Policy
2025 – Taking Stock of the Dahrendorf
Foresight Project
Monika Sus
Hertie School of Governance
Abstract
After a decade of economic and political crises, the European Union has arrived at a critical juncture, as has its foreign policy.
The long-running debate on gaining more coherence in EU’s external action as a global security provider has gained more
traction than ever before. The Union is weakened due to recent internal crises from which it is only slowly recovering: the
trust placed in Brussels’ institutions by both European citizens and global partners is shrinking and the citizens of one of the
EU’s largest member states, the United Kingdom, have just voted to leave. Based on an analysis of the current state of
the Union, this paper takes stock of the outcomes of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project and looks ahead at the EU’s role in the
world of 2025. By following the narrative of driving forces beyond the EU’s foreign policy, this article makes four policy recom-
mendations for development within the next decade.
The European Union stands at a critical juncture, as does
its foreign and security policy. Among all the political and
economic turmoil that has pulled the Union apart and
divided it internally in the last decade, Brexit has deliv-
ered the coup de gra^ce. As the High Representative of
the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Frederica
Mogherini (HR), pointed out in June when presenting the
new EU Global Strategy (EUGS), ‘the purpose, even the
existence, of our Union is being questioned’ (EUGS, 2016,
p. 22 ). The perception that existential pressure from both
inside (growing political polarisation, domestic terrorism,
ﬁscal instability) and outside (Daesh (IS), refugee and
migration crisis, geopolitical ambitions of Russia) will trans-
form the European project seems widely shared. The
future of the Union is uncertain. The EU has been deﬁni-
tively knocked out of its comfort zone where political and
economic stability, liberal order based on the rule of law,
pluralism as well as the absence of major conﬂicts on
EU’s territory and in its neighbourhood had been taken
for granted. Navigating Europe through stormy waters
requires a systematic analysis of challenges that inﬂuence
the development of the European project, both internally
and externally. This paper deals with the latter, following
the assumption that external challenges intrude on EU’s
borders, enter into European societies and can pose a
threat to cohesion (ESPAS, 2015).
Drawing upon the outcomes of the Dahrendorf Foresight
Project (Sus and Pfeifer, 2016), this paper reﬂects brieﬂy on
the driving forces likely to shape the EU’s external dimension
and indicates necessary steps to be considered in formulating
and implementing future foreign and security policy over the
next decade. The aim is to show the applicability of scenario
methodology in illustrating future trajectories and downside
risks affecting the EU’s global role.
The paper is set up in three parts. Following an intro-
ductory section on the use of foresight methodology and
scenario generation as particular tools in studying foreign
policy, the paper successively presents four key drivers that
were developed within the Dahrendorf Foresight Project
and will determine the EU’s foreign policy making in the
coming ten years. Drawing on the identiﬁed driving forces,
it then puts forward four policy recommendations that
could be taken into consideration while re-shaping and
implementing the EU’s foreign policy. The concluding sec-
tion summarises the ﬁndings and links them to the
recently published EUGS – ‘Shared Visions, Common
Action: A stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Euro-
pean Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (EUGS).1 It
reﬂects to what extend the presented policy recommenda-
tions correspond to the strategy and addresses the ability
of both the EU institutions and the member states to
implement the vision.
Foresight analysis and the study of foreign policy
Military organisations were using scenario construction, in
the form of war games, for defence planning long before it
became a methodological approach of foresight analysis in
other ﬁelds (Van der Heijden et al., 2009). The ﬁrst to use
the methodology to identify economic, political and social
changes was the Shell Company. Already in the late 1960s
Shell was working with scenarios to foresee how the future
would unfold and impact the company (Shell, 2012). In view
of the growing energy demand, Shell’s scenario team dared
1
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to consider the unthinkable: what if the world were to face
an oil crisis?
Soon after, the energy crisis did in fact hit the world
economy. Shell company management claimed it was pre-
pared, thanks to scenarios in which it had played out the
crisis and its possible inﬂuence on the company. Since that
time, Shell has incorporated the scenario approach as an
indispensable component of strategic planning and the
company remains an important source of future studies.2
Others companies, government agencies, and think-tanks
have since followed Shell’s example. Experts and policy mak-
ers around the world apply foresight methodology with
growing frequency to think systematically about the future
and to generate a range of plausible strategic options by
challenging the current paradigm (Miles et al., 20083 ).
According to Peter Schwartz (19914 , p. 3), one of the leading
futurists worldwide, scenarios can be deﬁned as ‘stories
about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories
that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects
of our present environment’. In other words, ‘the power of
scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of
conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing
unusual combination of trends and deliberate discontinuities
in narratives about the future’ (Barma et al., 2015, p. 4).
The goal of generating scenarios is to deliver a set of
alternative futures based on systematic and rigorous analy-
ses of global trends, common assumptions and key forces
behind a given issue and thereby to widen the perspective
of policy makers. A good sense of driving forces, downside
risks, predetermined factors and possible outcomes helps
policy makers to make reasonable decisions and lower risks.
To illustrate this with an example: one of the forerunners of
scenario methodology, Herman Kahn (1962), argued in the
late 1950s and early 1960s that US policy makers should
prepare for the eventuality of a nuclear war with the Soviet
Union and every contingency that such a conﬂict would
entail worldwide. This way of thinking entirely contradicted
the conventional wisdom of the time. Soon after, the Cuban
Missile Crisis demonstrated that Kahn’s scenario was indeed
plausible.
That said, the world will remain a place of high uncer-
tainty. However, scenario methodology helps to keep strate-
gic surprises to a minimum and is to be preferred over
waiting passively for future events to unfold. It is not mere
forecasting based on a linear analysis of current patterns
nor simple hypothesis-based expert predictions, but rather
consists of various qualitative and quantitative approaches,
including the generation of multiple scenarios, which is one
of the most promising, especially in cases of great uncer-
tainty (Popper, 2008; Pherson, 2015). Figure 1 illustrates the
process of multiple scenarios generation.
This approach envisions the generation of multiple sce-
narios to ensure the most comprehensive overview of a par-
ticular risk. All scenarios are screened and undergo a rigid
selection process before only the best among them are
passed on for further analysis.
The value of scenarios for foreign policy analysis is mea-
sured using three main indicators. First, they widen the
perspective to cover a range of unexpected yet plausible
outcomes based on various pairings of key drivers; thus, sce-
narios break the assumption that the future will resemble
the past and that change is only gradual. Second, scenario
methodology facilitates contrarian thinking and undermines
the groupthink that often occurs in homogeneous environ-
ments; and foreign policy elites of the past have shown that
they are not immune to its sometimes fatal consequences.
Third, foresight methodology in general and scenario
approaches in particular offer a viable tool to bridge the
growing gap between academia and policy making.
Appropriately referred to as the ‘cult of irrelevance’ (Walt,
2005 5, 2009), many prominent social scientists have high-
lighted this chasm between abstract ‘academic’ research
and the needs of decision makers to obtain policy-relevant
advice. A lack of effective transmission is damaging for both
sides, since theory is an essential tool for evaluating the
impact of policies, explaining causal developments and
identifying directions of change. So, voices are becoming
louder that propose to enhance the policy relevance of
research in international relations (IR) and to communicate
outcomes and implications of the research ﬁndings to policy
makers in a comprehensible manner (Desch, 2009; Nye,
2009). Scenario methodology is one of the most effective
research techniques to link academic theories with empirical
data in order to understand future world events more fully,
as it combines in-depth analysis with relevant policy implica-
tions and/or recommendations. Scenario thinking corre-
sponds well with the thinking of scholars who have an
eclectic approach (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001–2002)
and apply more pragmatism in IR reasoning (Friedrichs and
Kratochwil, 2009). Given the lack of adequate methodology
in the ﬁeld of IR that would allow for analysing future
events, a systematic scenario methodology could contribute
to ﬁlling the gap.
In light of the uncertainty of foreign policy of states and
organisations and the diverse factors of inﬂuence, it seems
to be a must for foreign policy experts to go beyond con-
ventional wisdom and extrapolations of contemporary pat-
terns in order to arrive at possible future courses of action.
So, it is no surprise that several foresight exercises within
the last decade have had foreign and security policies as
their subject (Stein Gross et al., 1998; Zhang, 2004; Richard-
son, 2005; Celik and Blum, 2007; Van Notten, 2014). Though
several of these projects centred on the future of the EU,
there is still great potential for the development of strategic
foresight within and for the Union (Missiroli, 2013 6). The EU’s
awareness of its global role has increased in recent years
and this could be an important step towards more strategic
thinking on how to pursue the Union’s external interests. As
Jan Techau (2016) rightly predicted at the beginning of
2016, the EU Global Strategy has expressed the EU’s global
interests more clearly than ever before, in a quasi realpolitik
tenor: peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rule-
based global order. However, the majority of EU foresight
projects so far have addressed the future of the European
project as such, the functioning of its institutions and gen-
eral governance structures (Schinas, 2012; Grevi et al., 2013);
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only a few have dealt with the EU’s foreign policy (Tocci
and Alcaro, 2012; Kleine-Brockhoff, 2013). The Dahrendorf
Foresight Project is the latest example of such an endeav-
our. A systematic and forward-looking analysis of the key
forces that will shape the external relations of the European
Union with both its strategic partners China and the US and
its neighbours Turkey, the MENA region and Ukraine in
2025, the Dahrendorf Foresight Project provided a solid
footing for charting the course of policy actions relating to
the EU’s role in the world (Sus and Pfeifer, 2016).
Driving forces behind the development of the
EU’s external role
Drawing on the outcomes of the Dahrendorf Foresight Pro-
ject, this paper presents four key drivers which will affect
the EU’s global role within the next ten years. Key drivers
are in this case central causal forces that surround the for-
eign policy of the Union and which determine its future
course. These are: (1) cohesion of interests in the global
order; (2) EU capacity for collective action; (3) economic
resilience of the Union; and (4) political and social inclusion
in the member states.
The cohesion of interests on global order between the EU
and other major powers in the world (most of all, the Uni-
ted States and China; in the coming years, possibly also the
United Kingdom) will be essential for European foreign pol-
icy making and should not be taken for granted. The next
decade may witness a diversiﬁcation of preferences among
the various stakeholders concerning the functioning of inter-
national institutions and fora such as the United Nations,
the G7 or its successor the G20, but also the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The same trend
may affect their geopolitical strategies and diplomatic
endeavours in existing conﬂicts, for example, in Syria. As
Donald Trump has won the presidential election, a gradual
disengagement of the US in the world is probable and
could challenge the existing world order. A similar challenge
could result if Euroscepticism continues its successful run in
several EU member states and renationalising tendencies
become dominant. An inward looking Union will neither be
able, nor willing to offer an essential contribution to
Figure 1. Multiple scenarios generation
Definition and validation of indicators
Developent of observable phenomena (indicators) that help to spot emerging scenarios and trends, 
validate hypothesis and warn of unanticipated changes
Deveoping narratives for choosen scnearios 
Construction of narratives for the lead scenarios including a label, relevant key drivers, key 
characteristics, short chronology and implications
Multiple scenarios generation and choice of most attention-deserving 
Generation of scenarios based on two different pairings of key drivers (2 ×2 matrices) and choice of 
four most attention-deserving scenarios
Definition of key drivers 
Lead questions are: what is known about this key driver? What more do we need to know? If 
portrayed as a spectrum, how would we define the most extreme, but plausible, ends of the 
spectrum? 
Selection of key drivers 
Review of candidate key drivers and selection of four or five that best capture the greatest 
uncertainties in anticipating how the topic will evolve over the next years
Identification of key drivers based on solid key assumptions 
Identification of forces, factors or events that are most likely to shape the future trajectory of the 
selected case
Key assumption check
Critical review of facts that are taken for granted regarding the topic and validation of the 
assumptions along three categories: solid, caveats or unsupported
Source: own compilation based on the materials of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project.
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international law standards and the rule-based world order.
Taking into account the current vast diversiﬁcation of risks
and multidimensional security challenges throughout the
world, it will be more important than ever for the EU as an
organisation to coordinate between world powers and
develop a shared position on major geopolitical and security
issues. As well, it will be necessary to formulate geopolitical
strategies in the face of rising powers, to continue the inter-
national negotiations on climate change and the future of
the Arctic or nuclear disarmament, and to pursue the Sus-
tainable Development Goals. As Mogherini emphasised in
her foreword to the Global Strategy 2016, ‘This is no time
for global policemen and lone warriors’ (EUGS, 2016, p. 4);
only by sharing global responsibilities among its partners
will the EU be able to develop the strength necessary –
both as a unit and at the level of individual member states
– to revamp the rule-based world order.
The second driving force is the EU’s ability to act collec-
tively, which is noticeable in the repeated calls for more
coherence and cohesion in external actions (Nuttall, 20057 ). It
goes without saying that the individual member states differ
from one another with regard to their foreign policy priori-
ties and responses. Accordingly, they sometimes prefer to
act single-handedly without waiting for consensus among
all EU countries, as was evident in the different responses to
the Libyan political crisis in 2011 (Koenig, 2011). However,
one of the essential prerequisites of the visible EU’s foreign
policy is precisely the willingness and ability of the national
governments to agree on shared interests and to implement
collective action in order to pursue them in relationship with
third parties (Smith, 2013). Failing to determine a common
position paralyses the Union and makes external action
impossible (Zielonka, 1998). Intergovernmental decision
making in this ﬁeld should be supported by the suprana-
tional coordination of the EEAS the European Commission
as the institutions can offer guidelines and put pressure on
member states to conform. A series of domestic political
dynamics currently occurring in several EU countries, grow-
ing levels of populism (due to terrorist attacks or high num-
bers of migrants and refugees, etc.) and the notion of
renationalisation all have a negative impact on the Union’s
ability to act collectively. At the same time, multidimensional
security challenges such as failed states and fragile regimes
among its neighbours, hybrid warfare, terrorism and cyber
security dangers can force a future EU to respond with hard
power because the traditional soft power has proven insufﬁ-
cient. In fact, the HR has already started to implement the
defence and security reforms outlined in the EUGS (Council
of the EU, 2016b), but it will require the willingness of the
other member states to proceed with the transformation of
the EU’s defence capacities. This has become especially
important in light of Donald Trump’s victory, since he has
expressed uncertainty regarding all future American military
backup of the Union’s diplomatic efforts in the world
(McCurry, 2016; Melvin, 2016).
In addition, the long-term impact of Brexit on the EU’s
ability to undertake common external action is still unclear.
On the one hand, there was London’s traditional resistance
to the EU’s several attempts to coordinate a joint foreign
policy (Hill, 1996); on the other hand, due to Britain’s overall
military and diplomatic strength, its exit means that the
Union as a whole will lose an important asset for its future
strategic planning. In any case, Europe’s ability to act from a
position of political strength and, hence, as a unity will
determine its future foreign policy over the next decade.
The third driving factor, the economic resilience of the
EU, has become apparent in the years of economic and
ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2008 and from which several
European countries continue to suffer severely. Without
going into detail on the various deﬁnitions of resilience, at
its simplest, the concept refers to the ability of a country or
a system to recover to its pre-crisis level (EUGS, 2016). The
faster the economy bounces back to its pre-shock position
the more resilient it is. The economic decline of member
states as a result of the crisis of 2008 was the most severe
in EU history, yet its effects were distributed asymmetrically
and some countries turned out to be more resilient than
others. In general, the crisis undermined not only the econ-
omy of the Eurozone, but it also weakened EU’s leverage in
neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine (Sus, 2014) and
called into question the role of the EU as an international
actor (Kempin and Overhaus, 2014).
If economically weak and ﬁscally unstable, the Union is
neither able to invest its resources abroad nor can it serve
as a model of successful economic governance by suprana-
tional and national institutions. Accordingly, economic inte-
gration not only laid the groundwork for the integration of
further policy areas, it also has remained the core criterion
for determining the success of the European project as
such.
Without doubt, functioning as an economic, industrial and
trading powerhouse constitutes one of the EU’s greatest
assets. Moreover, the ability of both the national govern-
ments and the EU’s institutions to provide its citizens with
prosperity based on economic growth is essential in order
to resist the catchphrases of both right-wing and left-wing
extremist parties. Especially important here seems to be the
issue of unemployment, which is still a highly problematic
issue for several European countries; in 2014, over 50 per
cent of all EU citizens declared unemployment as the
Union’s main challenge (Special Eurobarometer, 2014). The
frail labour market situation in some member states remains
a serious problem. According to data from June 2016, the
unemployment rate is highest in Greece with 23.3 per cent,
followed by Spain with 19.9 per cent and Croatia with 13.2
per cent (Eurostat, 2016).
Eventually, what will determine the EU’s foreign policy is
the political and social inclusion in its member states, since
it is fundamental for the credibility of the Union as an inter-
national actor. Inclusion is a broad concept, most basically it
is the opposite of exclusion due to economic, political or
social (religious, cultural, or gender, age and class-based)
factors. Exclusion manifests whenever pluralism and demo-
cratic procedures are suppressed, human rights are system-
atically abused – when women, political, religious or ethnic
minorities are discriminated against or governance has
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shown itself to be authoritarian and unaccountable. For
example, in countries where inclusion due to economic or
political factors becomes weaker, radicalisation tendencies
start to appear (Wallerstein, 2005; Williamson, 2014). Spain is
a case in point, where the youth unemployment reached a
high point in 2013 when it hit 55.9 per cent (Eurostat, 2016)
and young people rallied in Madrid against EU-imposed aus-
terity measures; some demonstrations turned violent (BBC
News, 2014). The Greek example also shows that young
people, frustrated by an unemployment rate of 60 per cent
in 2013 (Eurostat, 2016), have intensiﬁed social unrest
against the mainstream political institutions. It resulted in
the spectacular rise of the radical left-wing Syriza in the
general elections of 2012 (Kretsos, 2014). The European
Union is slowly recovering from the economic crisis, but the
share of young people threatened by poverty or social
exclusion remains high and could lead to more violent
extremism in EU societies. Two years ago, 32 per cent of
respondents from the member states identiﬁed social
inequalities as the main threat to EU cohesion (Special Euro-
barometer, 2014), so the need to tackle these tendencies is
urgent.
At the same time, as the elections to the European Parlia-
ment in 2014 as well as a series of national elections have
shown, right-wing populist and extremist parties are undeni-
ably on the rise. Combined with a growing mistrust among
citizens of established political parties, we may see populists
moving increasingly into the mainstream (Akkerman, de
Lange and Rooduijn, 20168 ). In fact, not only in the relatively
young democracies such as Hungary and Poland, but also in
Austria, France, Denmark or Germany right-wing parties
score surprisingly well and are close to either winning the
elections or at least to becoming meaningful political pow-
ers (Aisch et al., 2016). Their straightforward dismissal of val-
ues such as pluralism, respect for human rights, and rule of
law undermines the EU’s democracies and damages its
standing with its neighbours and strategic partners (also see
the article on anti-liberalism from Owen in this special
issue). If the EU fails to protect its own values on its terri-
tory, it will lose its credibility as a trustworthy partner for its
neighbours and for other world powers. Living up to the
founding principles will determine the Union’s capability to
exert an external inﬂuence.
EU foreign policy in 2025
According to the scenario method as presented above, iden-
tifying the key forces that will inﬂuence the EU’s foreign pol-
icy in the next decade facilitates the formulation of policy
recommendations.
Thinking differently about coherence in EU foreign policy
Understood as the EU’s ability to perform collectively, ‘co-
herence’ does not have to mean that all 28 (in the foresee-
able future: 27) member states must act together as a unity.
It seems utopian to still consider it a prerequisite for effec-
tive foreign policy making. The global challenges currently
confronting the EU are multidimensional and more incalcu-
lable than ever before, so they should be addressed in a
more pragmatic and multidimensional manner.
It is time to make use of the institutional innovations
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which allow for the
establishment of more pragmatic coalitions of member
states that are willing to act together. Enhanced cooperation
in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is not only
inevitable but also highly desirable. This is particularly the
case for variable coalitions of EU countries that, due to an
alignment of their (geo)political or economic interests, are
willing to take a lead in particular policy areas or relations
towards a particular country or region. The notion of ‘coali-
tions of the willing’, which more generally has been used to
describe US-led coalitions within the United Nations (Beeh-
ner, 2007) rather than EU member state alignments, could
be adapted for a future European foreign policy. It would
also allow the Union to make the best use of the unique
expertise and experience of each member state in different
areas of external action: ‘[T]he diversity of the experience,
expertise and proﬁle of the EUs member states can be a
major political resource for the Union, if their initiatives are
framed in common objectives and undertaken either indi-
vidually or via ﬂexible formats’ (Grevi et al., 2013, pp. 57–
58). In the same spirit, the EUGS proposes that a ‘Member
State or a group of Member States who are willing and able
to contribute may be invited by the HR, under the responsi-
bility of the Council, to implement agreed positions of the
Council’ (EUGS, 2016, p. 47). The Treaty of Lisbon already
foresees two possibilities of entrusting a group of members
with a speciﬁc task. One is the permanent structured coop-
eration (PESCO) introduced in Articles 42(6) and 46, which
concern exclusively the ﬁeld of defence; the other is a more
open formula for enhanced cooperation within CFSP intro-
duced in Article 43 and 44 (Treaty of the EU, 2012). It is time
to apply the possibilities offered by the Treaty the ﬁeld of
security and defence (Risse, 2012). Also worth considering is
a ‘coalition of the willing’ with an Eastern or Southern
dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
respective to the interests and competences of individual
member states.
The EEAS and its head, the HR, should provide the coordi-
nation of such endeavours in close cooperation with the
European Commission in order to ensure consistency with
agreed EU policies. The HR would undoubtedly beneﬁt from
member states’ boosted engagement in the EU’s external
affairs, since a new concept of labour division among
numerous EU foreign policy stakeholders is urgently needed.
A broad-based debate and consensus around shared strate-
gic interests should facilitate the formulation of a new con-
cept of labour division. The added value of this process
would also lend a greater sense of ownership over the
Union’s foreign policy to its member states, who would then
ideally feel more responsible for the policy endeavours they
initiated and supported.
Using the powerful tools offered by the Treaty of Lisbon
and pursuing the direction of ﬂexible coalitions is a matter
of political will. In the words of Mogherini (2016b), it is ‘only
Global Policy (2017) © 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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a matter of political will. This seems easy, but sometimes we
know political will is one of the most difﬁcult things to
build’.
Removing a spell from differentiated integration
As the scenarios developed within the Dahrendorf Foresight
Project have shown (Sus and Pfeifer, 2016), further enlarge-
ment of the EU is not on the table for the foreseeable future
(European Commission, 2014); nor has the ENP been effective
in creating a ‘ring of friends’ (Prodi, 2012) beyond the EU bor-
ders. Nonetheless, there are several countries in the accession
process and others are waiting in line, still hoping to start
negotiations or sign Association Agreements. At the same
time, differentiated integration,3 labelled also as ﬂexibility,
variable geometry, opt-outs or derogations, both within Euro-
pean borders (for example, the Schengen area and the Euro-
zone) and outside the EU (for example, the European
Economic Area with Lichtenstein, Norway, Iceland and
Switzerland), is a fact. It appeared in various forms in the
Union’s earlier history and has divided member states into a
group of those willing to proceed more rapidly towards a clo-
ser integration and those who would decline some features of
the present system of integration, such as a common currency
or a common defence policy (Majone, 2005). Moreover, since
parts of the EU acquis already apply to a number of non-
members, the border between these two positions is blurred
(Raik and Tamminen, 2014). For example, Norway as a non-EU
country closely cooperates with the Union not only on eco-
nomic issues but also on issues of foreign and security policy
by taking part in daily coordination and consultation meet-
ings with the EEAS and the member states in order to safe-
guard common positions.4
Turning the current situation into an advantage by creat-
ing issue-related partnerships with neighbours like Ukraine,
Turkey or the Western Balkan countries would help to over-
come the deadlock of both the enlargement and the ailing
neighbourhood policy. Non-EU countries could engage in
subsets dealing with energy, trade, migration, etc. and
thereby strengthen their relationship with the EU. This could
be a way for the EU to regain its transformative power,
which currently is rather a memory of the past; it seems the
EU has become a ‘super-partner’ and not a superpower to
its neighbours (Grevi et al., 2013).
Europe’s development into a two-level or multi-level
Union has become even more inevitable following the UK
vote to exit. It is not clear yet which type of European inte-
gration London would like to adopt once it relinquishes
membership status. But it is clear that a compromise will
have to be found. Since EU leaders seem united in their
position that, due to the British decision to leave the EU,
the UK should be shorn of lose any beneﬁts it used to have
as a member state for example the access to common mar-
ket. At the same time, the UK will remain an important eco-
nomic and political partner for the Union and a way for
close cooperation will probably have to be found.
Given this backdrop, the differentiated integration model
could strengthen the EU by bolstering cooperation with its
neighbours and letting its member states decide the extent
of their economic and political integration. A restructured
Union with a strong, closely integrated core and associated
circles of integration with varied political or economic priori-
ties could make the EU a more credible partner for other
countries and regions in the future. To take an example, the
EU might thus consider extending the European Economic
Area to include countries that have already signed Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreements (Western Balkan) or Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (Georgia, Mol-
dova and Ukraine). The existing Energy Community (EU,
Western Balkan, Ukraine and Moldova)5 could be linked with
the recently launched Energy Union6 and used as a platform
for intensive cooperation in this area.
Already over a decade ago, Majone (2005, p. 16) sig-
nalised that differentiated integration is not a ‘momentary
aberration but the clear indication of an emergent strategy
for achieving progress in politically sensitive areas, even at
the price of a loss of overall coherence of the system’. How-
ever, it is essential to remember that a multi-speed
approach can also pose a danger for the integration project
by putting it at risk of dissolving the entire EU and creating
tensions due to the existence of two-tier or multi-tier mem-
ber status. In addition, offering candidate states or neigh-
bouring states to joint different integration cycles will not
be as rewarding to them as an offer of full membership
(Raik and Tamminen, 2014). But enlargement will not hap-
pen in the foreseeable future; in view of the rise of populist
parties in several member states, and taking Brexit into
account as well as the current difﬁcult economic situations
in some Eurozone countries, a restructuring of the Union
seems inevitable anyway. The idea of differentiated integra-
tion allows for controlling the process and avoiding escala-
tion of anti-EU tendencies that could otherwise put an end
to further integration on the continent. The biggest chal-
lenge is thus to decide what are the areas in which unity
and where opt-outs are acceptable. It is crucial that all EU
members comply with these decisions.
Early warning mechanisms against extreme right-wing
parties
It goes without saying that the future of European foreign
policy starts at home. Domestic vulnerabilities play a great
role in EU’s foreign policy as the member states are the
main decision makers in this ﬁeld.
The scenarios developed within the Dahrendorf Foresight
Project can evoke the impression that the endorsement of
right-wing populists is growing across the Union. As pre-
sented in the previous sections of this paper, the ability to
reassure political and economic inclusion within member
states and thereby to overcome the challenge of growing
support for populist parties should be included as another
key driver of future EU foreign policy. Not only the Eastern
European countries Hungary, Slovakia and Poland but also
France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria must ﬁnd
effective measures against rising EU-sceptic parties. Accord-
ing to an analysis published by the European Council on
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Foreign Relations, insurgent parties already play a direct role
in the governance of eight of the EU’s 28 countries (Den-
nison, 2016).
Therefore, not only the national elites but also the EU
leadership are in need of a political early warning mecha-
nism to address these movements and a strategy to counter
the trend towards more nativist, populist, authoritarian sen-
timents before they become irreversible. Otherwise, in the
face of several countries turning towards isolationism and
self-protection of their national interests, the European pro-
ject of a common foreign policy will probably be aban-
doned, since the member states will lose interest in
cultivating a common European role on the global stage. A
case in point is offered by the recent non-binding referen-
dum in the Netherlands, where the majority of citizens
rejected the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (White,
2016).
So, the support for extreme right-wing parties seems to
be one of the essential internal challenges for the EU’s for-
eign policy. It should be tackled on the EU level through
very ﬁrm action against the right-wing parties’ attempts to
break democratic rules and by raising widespread awareness
through campaigns for the common strategic interests of
the member states. The beneﬁts of European integration
should be brokered as a tangible reality for all, since the
number of EU citizens declaring their trust in the Union has
decreased from 57 per cent in 2007 to 33 per cent in 2016
(Eurobarometer, 2016).
In addition, as Figure 2 shows, 27 per cent of EU citizens
declare to have a negative picture of the EU, 34 per cent
have a positive view and 38 per cent are rather neutral.
Moreover, more than 55 per cent of Europeans have
expressed the opinion that their voice does not count in the
EU (Eurobarometer, 2016, p. 16). Taken together, these data
make the societies of its member states very vulnerable to
the rhetoric of anti-EU parties (Figure 3).
Developing long-term strategic thinking capacities
Finally, the success of the EU’s foreign policy will be deter-
mined by the ability to think ahead. The Dahrendorf Fore-
sight Project reveals that the EU’s relations with its strategic
partners and neighbours may take a course for which it is
deﬁnitely not prepared. US interest and support for the
European project should not be taken for granted, as the
Americans’ role as global police ofﬁcer might be coming to
an end. China may develop into a stronger actor, willing to
take over responsibilities beyond its borders and challenge
the EU in issues related to climate change. Russia might
abandon its neo-imperialist and authoritarian tendencies
and get back on a track of constructive cooperation. In
some MENA countries, anti-democratic tendencies may
become stronger and their governments might decide on
soft authoritarianism as a political system, similar to China’s
model. Turkey might become even more autocratic and
more politically and economically interlinked with Russia
and lose interest in cooperating with the EU. To avoid being
caught by surprise, the EU should proactively engage in
areas that may become strategic in the future, such as cli-
mate policy cooperation with China, working with Turkey on
Figure 2.17 The image of the European Union among EU citizens 2006–2016
Source: own visualisation based on Eurobarometer (2016, p. 15).
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energy policy issues or staying united with Russia in the
ﬁght against Daesh. This also seems essential because the
potential leadership vacuum in the event of a more isola-
tionist US will transform the global shift of power currently
underway into a global disorder, which may become the
reality of 2025.
In light of the overwhelming and unexpected challenges
which have jolted the EU and most probably will continue
to shake it to its foundation, some EU ofﬁcials and experts
have started embracing strategic thinking in policy making.
Yet the drafting process of the EUGS and the recent
attempts to enhance the strategic capabilities across the EU
institutions are still not sufﬁcient. Global trend analyses and
comprehensive foresight thinking should be integrated fully
into the EU’s foreign policy planning since the challenges in
this ﬁeld are proliferating. The Strategic Planning Division
within the EEAS, the inter-institutional European Strategy
and Policy Analysis System, the European Political Strategy
Centre within the European Commission, the Long Term
Trends Team at the Cabinet of the Secretary General of the
European Parliament and various actors dealing with fore-
sight studies from member states the should combine
resources in order to tackle the future challenges. At the
same time, strategic planning of the EU’s external actions
should involve regular evaluation of the Union’s perfor-
mance in various dimensions of its international involve-
ment (Kleistra and van Willigen, 2010).
The challenge lies not only in a sober assessment of dan-
gers, but also, primarily, in ﬁguring out how to use the avail-
able instruments effectively. The 2003 strategy already
aimed at better coordination between various actors and
instruments in executing EU foreign policy interests. How-
ever, the delivery was lacking since the document offered a
general vision rather than a concrete plan on how to act.7
Against this backdrop, operationalisation should become the
priority of strategic thinking and with the implementation of
the recently published EU Global Strategy it is high time to
start, as ‘the political vision set out in the EUGS will be
swiftly translated into concrete policy initiatives and action’
(Council of the EU, 2016a). The HR has announced several
action plans following the strategic document to be pub-
lished and put into effect in the autumn of 2016. In Novem-
ber, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence was
adopted (Council of the EU, 2016b), which aims at changing
the institutional structure of security and defence at the EU
level and at providing for the capabilities to develop a Euro-
pean defence industry (Mogherini, 2016a). Further steps
should follow according to the roadmap on the follow-up to
the EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016 9).
Conclusions
The European Union has arrived at a critical juncture and
faces some troubling uncertainty; so, foreseeing its future in
2025 is a fascinating yet challenging task. Drawing on key
forces identiﬁed during the Dahrendorf Foresight Project,
this paper has pointed out four steps to be taken into con-
sideration when formulating and implementing future EU
foreign policy. The four proposals correspond to the leading
principles of the EUGS, namely, principled pragmatism and
Figure 3.18 My voice counts in the European Union 2006–2016
Source: Own visualisation based on Eurobarometer (2016, p. 15).
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resilience of the Union. But they go beyond these general
directives to offer concrete suggestions for policy action, as
they are backed up by systematic and rigorous foresight
analyses of global trends, common assumptions and key
forces that will be essential for EU’s foreign policy in 2025.
As Neale Donald Walsch10 rightly said, ‘Life begins at the
end of your comfort zone’, meaning that we learn most by
challenging ourselves. One can paraphrase the statement
and apply it to the current situation of the EU. Times in
which ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor
so free’ – when it enjoyed a ‘period of peace and stability
unprecedented in European history’ – are now a distant
memory (European Council, 2003, p. 1). The EU is mired in
deep crisis and outside of its comfort zone with no end yet
in sight. Luckily, history provides several examples showing
that critical junctures can become an impulse for moving
forward towards a different and more resilient community.
The very idea for the European Community evolved from
the experience of a devastating war as a remedy to secure
stability, peace and prosperity. The beginnings of the inte-
gration process in the 1950s were marked by failed
attempts to establish the European Defence Community and
the European Political Community, but they were followed
by the successful development of the European Economic
Community. Among the most recent examples for the
Union’s ability to overcome crisis, what comes to mind is
the establishment of the Single Market project in 1992,
which emerged from ﬁscal problems and exchange rate tur-
bulences in the 1970s and 1980s and resulted in the intro-
duction of the common currency. The French and Dutch
turndowns of the Constitutional Treaty as well as the Irish
objection to the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 were overcome and
so the Lisbon Treaty was signed and ratiﬁed. Eventually, the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis of the Eurozone revealed the insufﬁ-
ciency of the Economic and Monetary Union and concerned
voices pushed for a deepening of integration in this ﬁeld via
the European Fiscal Pact and banking union.
Yet, muddling through the numerous crisis of the recent
decade, the Union has experienced a decrease in public
support. Thus, in order to come back to a path of integra-
tion, the EU must risk transforming itself in fundamental
ways and, ﬁrst and foremost, regain the trust of its citizens.
Otherwise it will plunge into even further disintegration.
Notes
1. For a full text, see: https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_revie
w_web.pdf.
2. For more on Shell and its scenarios, see: http://www.shell.com/ene
rgy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios.html.
3. For a classiﬁcation of differentiated integration, see: Stubb, A. (1996)
‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’, Journal of Common
Market Studies, 34:2, pp. 281-295.
4. For more information, see: Norway mission to the EU http://www.eu-
norway.org/ [Accessed 24 January 2017].
5. For more information on the Energy Community, see: https://www.e
nergy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME.
6. For more information on the Energy Union, see: https://ec.europa.eu/
priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en.
7. For more about the characteristics of ESS 2003 and the difference
with EUGS 2016, see: Cooper (2015).
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